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‘Putting cruelty first’: interpreting war crimes as human rights atrocities in US 
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Abstract:  
This paper contributes to an understanding of the role of agency in a sociology of human 
right by examining how a small group of individuals interpreted, defined, and instantiated 
‘hard’ human rights, or those atrocities associated with war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. Using political theorist Judith Shklar’s perpetrator-focused framework of 
‘putting the prevention of cruelty first’, we explore the role of agency in the construction 
of human rights through the empirical lens of US war crimes policies around the 1995 
Dayton Peace Accords for Bosnia-Herzegovina. We draw on US State Department 
documents, and on interviews with key participants in the Accords, to argue that a richer 
sociology of human rights—seen as socially situated and embedded—requires a fuller 
appreciation of the experiences of key social actors in those social locations in which 
human rights are articulated, interpreted, and actualized. 
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This paper considers the relatively neglected role of agency in sociological theorizing on 
human rights. It does so by exploring how a small group of individuals interpreted and 
instantiated human rights through a perpetrator-focused view of ‘hard’ human rights—or 
those atrocities associated with war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, such 
as physical brutality, extra-judicial summary executions, war rape, detention and torture, 
and coerced displacement, among other abuses.1 Drawing on political theorist Judith 
Shklar’s call in Ordinary Vices to ‘put cruelty first’—or to prioritize the prevention of these 
state-led human rights atrocities above all else because the ability to inflict mass levels of 
fear, intimidation, and brutality often rests uniquely with the perpetrator state and its 
agents or instruments of coercion—we show how such an approach to hard human 
rights might offer an alternative way of contextualizing the sociological role of agency in 
the construction, interpretation, and instantiation of human rights.  
We try to explicate what such an approach might look like empirically through an 
analysis of US policies around war crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the early 1990s, 
focusing in particular on policies leading to the November 1995 Dayton peace talks, 
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which ended the three-year Bosnian war. Analysis of State Department documents 
released under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), and interviews with key 
architects of the Dayton Peace Accords, suggest that a small, informal ‘war crimes 
working group’ of lawyers and mid-level officials emerged within the lower bureaus of 
the State Department in the early 1990s. These social actors analysed and interpreted war 
crimes as human rights claims; they redefined mounting human rights atrocities as 
breaches of political citizenship by the perpetrator state. This distinctive political 
construction of hard human rights by this particular group of US elites had the effect of 
shifting the human rights’ narrative away from a victim-centred framework based on 
dignity or frailty, to one that was perpetrator or state focused. In this way, mid-level State 
Department officials’ social agency served as an important location or site of human 
rights construction and embeddedness. 
We draw primarily on US State Department documents, UN Commission of 
Experts Reports, and in-depth interviews with thirteen individuals, including key 
architects of the Dayton process and US human rights policy. State Department archival 
documents regarding US Bosnia policy between December 1991 and February 1997, and 
released under the US FOIA, contain 213 reports, policy analyses, internal memos, 
telegrams, and legal briefs concerning human rights and war crimes. They are a partial 
release of a larger repository that remains classified (awaiting further FOIA requests), so 
we stress that our assessments are necessarily limited and tentative, in anticipation of the 
full archival release.  
Our approach was premised on the assumption that the practice of human rights 
lies in their embeddedness in social locations of political power, and in the ways in which 
this power is exercised, legitimated, or constrained; put differently, we sought to examine 
the political culture and institutional locations that shape the categories available for the 
construction of expertise and knowledge around human rights and war crimes (see 
Fourcade, 2009; Camic et al., 2011). How do structures of power deal with evidence of 
mass atrocity, and in particular, how did the State Department become a site of human 
rights knowledge production? After a theoretical contextualization, we explore the social 
agency of this ‘war crimes working group’ and their application of ‘putting cruelty first’, 
first in terms of an interpretive narrative of the perpetrator, then of the victims, and 
finally through their construction of war crimes as politically-inflected human rights 
violations. 
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A perpetrator-centred framework and agency in human rights’ theorizing 
Sociological scholarship working toward a sociology of human rights has explored, 
among other things, the power or organizational arrangements underpinning human 
rights claims (Sjoberg et al., 2001), human rights universalist foundations (Turner, 1993, 
2006), its discursive dimensions (Woodiwiss, 2005), the normative nexus between human 
rights and citizenship (Somers and Roberts, 2008), its potential for a developing a public 
sociology of human rights (Burawoy, 2006; Hagan et al., 2006), and the theoretical and 
practical implications of qualitative versus quantitative approaches to human rights 
(Hafner-Burton and Ron, 2009). And yet it has paid comparatively little attention to the 
ways in which social agency can define human rights and produce a social knowledge 
around them, that is, to how rights may be interpreted and embedded by social actors 
(see discussion in Hynes et al., 2010: 820-2). Our data suggests that a particular 
interpretation of human rights emerged in a particular social context as a value 
constructed and defined by a key social constituency, one whose role in interpreting and 
shaping rights was determinative. More specifically, a group of international/human 
rights lawyers in mid- and low-level bureaus within the State Department effectively 
merged ‘war crimes’ and ‘human rights’ by viewing them through a politically 
universalist, state-centred prism that made the prevention of cruelty a policy priority. 
While this interpretation reflected a distinctive social contract rights culture as 
vernacularized through the US legal profession in the early and mid-1990s (Henkin, 
1979; Lillich, 1990; Koh, 2003), in practice, it also constructed a narrative around war 
crimes’ evidence that moved away from a universalist focus on victims’ human dignity, 
and towards a more perpetrator-centred, political narrative in which citizenship rights 
were violated by a state held to be accountable. 
So in sociologically acknowledging the utility of human frailty or vulnerability as 
an embodied universalist foundation or framework for human rights, by conceptualizing 
how the precariousness of citizens’ rights can be related to the human rights of 
individuals, this framing might also address the values that arise from the recognition of 
shared vulnerability in the face of organized killing and systematic or extreme violence 
(Turner, 1993, 2006: Ch.1). It suggests, therefore, a distinctive theoretical lens with which 
to view social agency within a broader sociology of human rights.  
It does so by opening the possibility of viewing agency through a particular 
normative lens: here, we draw on Shklar’s (1984) concept of ‘putting cruelty first’, a 
concept that is (a) tethered to the prevention of perpetrator, state-led human rights 
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atrocities, and (b) premised on the recognition that the ability to inflict certain levels of 
fear, intimidation, and violence often rests uniquely with the state and its agents, 
institutions, or instruments of coercion. Shklar (1984: 237-8) begins with the empirical 
observation ‘that the power to govern is the power to inflict fear and cruelty’; we must 
take this power seriously, or ‘hate cruelty cruelly’, because of its profoundly corrosive 
social, moral, and political effects. ‘Putting cruelty first’ is premised on an assumption 
that the actualities of state-driven fear, coercion, and abuse are so abhorrent, and their 
consequences so grave and de-humanizing, that they must be prioritized and prevented 
before all other considerations. On this view, the prevention of the fear caused by state 
brutality is itself irreducible and requires no further justification.  
‘This is not the liberalism of natural rights’, Shklar (1984: 238) observes, ‘but it 
underwrites rights as the politically indispensable dispersion of power, which alone can 
check the reign of fear and cruelty’. Ultimately, of course, this requires some version of 
representative constitutional democracy with institutional checks and constraints against 
state brutality. But in the immediate context of war crimes and genocide the urgent aim is 
to protect the most vulnerable against appalling cruelties, and to limit the ability of those 
who hold these coercive instruments of physical brutality from using them with 
impunity. To be sure, putting cruelty first as a way of actualizing hard human rights 
claims involves ethical and political compromises, and practical policy limitations, as we 
will see. But it nevertheless offers a useful analytical framework for articulating an 
agency-centred sociology of hard human rights that is as focused on the perpetrator’s 
capacity for cruelty as it is on the victim’s human dignity or vulnerability. 
In practice, this articulation of human rights, and indeed its instantiation, 
involved three closely related interpretive moves by the lawyers in the State Department, 
which redefined war crimes qua hard human rights abuses. First, hard human rights 
claims were instantiated and concretized when the victim was conceived not simply as a 
moral being, but as a political being whose political agency in the conflict needed urgent 
articulation (Shklar, 1984: 18). Second, just as the human rights victim was seen as a 
political being, a human rights claim for social protection was re-conceived as a political 
claim, reliant on state institutions or agents for its enforcement or denial. Treating the 
victim’s rights claim for protection as a constitutively political demand suggested a 
broader sociological conception of human rights that began to move away from its moral 
universalist, apolitical mooring around human dignity, into the politicized and violent 
space between the victim and the perpetrator/state. As a consequence this implied, 
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thirdly, that if the human rights claim was not to remain abstract or disembodied, but 
actualized and instantiated, then protecting vulnerable citizens from the state’s 
instruments of cruelty required something more than a moral, legal framework, or ‘liberal 
legalism’ (Bass, 2002; Hagan, 2003), but also a framework that offered a politically 
legitimate constraint on the state’s power to brutalize, i.e. a theory of the state’s ability to 
commit mass atrocity. In effect, US officials’ analysed hard human rights through a social 
contract or rights-based prism, which defined the responsibility of government to its 
citizens and articulated a basis for legitimizing a human rights’ claim for protection based 
on the properties (nationalist) and practices (organized ethnic cleansing) of the 
perpetrator (the state). 
 
A domestic human rights constituency emerges 
Following the break-up of Yugoslavia and the secession of Croatia and Slovenia in 1992, 
a three-year ethnic conflict—largely orchestrated by an aggressive nationalism in Serbia 
and a response by Croatia—spread into Bosnia-Herzegovina among Bosnian Serbs, 
Croats, and Muslims (later known as Bosniaks). The violence resulted in the deaths of 
more than 250,000 Bosnians and the forcible displacement of 2.2 million. From the first 
hostilities a number of US, EU, and UN peace attempts had tried—and failed—to bring 
an end to the violence, but in November 1995 the US-led Dayton Peace Accords 
resulted in a permanent cease fire and a politically redesigned Bosnian state.   
The defining feature of the war had been ethnic ‘cleansing’ (cišćenje terena), a term 
that originated during the conflict (Silber and Little, 1996: 171), and that referred to the 
mass rendering of an area ethnically homogenous by use of force or intimidation, and 
involving various tactics to effect population displacement, such as laying siege to cities 
and indiscriminately shelling civilian populations; starving populations of food and 
supplies; executing non-combatants; establishing concentration camps where thousands 
of prisoners were summarily executed and tens of thousand were subjected to torture 
and inhumane treatment; employing rape camps as tools to terrorize and uproot 
populations; and razing entire villages (United Nations, 1994).2  
Initially, the Clinton Administration’s policies were confused, ineffective, and 
characterized by a palpable sense of drift (Chollet, 2005: Ch. 1-5). But the horrific nature 
of the mounting atrocities were being documented in real time from early 1992 by the 
State Department, through refugee interviews and satellite images. As a result, US policy 
began to develop around efforts to set up a war crimes tribunal, something that human 
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rights organizations had also been advocating. These efforts were the product of a 
particular set of individuals—or a human rights constituency—that emerged within the 
smaller bureaus of the State Department, and whose interpretation or official narrative of 
Bosnian violence was to construct it as a politically-inflected fusion of war crimes with 
human rights.  
The Clinton Administration’s policy drift and its inability to bring an end to the 
ethnic violence had, however, led to frustration among mid-level officials and Balkan 
specialists, and eventually to the protest resignations of several junior State Department 
policy officers who were intimately familiar with the evidence of widespread brutalities.3 
But James O’Brien, a junior staff lawyer in the State Department’s Office of the Legal 
Adviser, had been given the usually quiet war crimes portfolio. In early 1992, as the 
Bosnian war exploded, and as he read the first press and intelligence reports detailing 
evidence of atrocities and ethnic cleansing, he consulted with State Department language 
officers for translations, and he began to voice the argument that these were, in fact, war 
crimes. O’Brien felt his unique vantage point at the war crimes desk allowed him to see 
Nuremberg as the policy precedent for moving on the material.4 Under the direction of 
his superior Michael Matheson, then Principal Deputy Legal Advisor, and with a small 
group of junior staffers, they guided this idea through political channels and sought the 
assistance of other countries.  
They proposed a tribunal under a UN Security Council mandate, and O’Brien, 
and State Department Attorney-Advisers Robert Kushen and David Scharf drafted its 
statute. In early 1993 the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established (cf. Scharf, 1997: Ch. 4; Scharf and Williams, 2010: 
Ch. 9, 10).5 It was criticized as both an instrument of US politics and as a weak substitute 
for a determined military or diplomatic response to the atrocities, though more narrowly 
it was hoped that it might deter further human rights violations, raise the costs of non-
compliance, and lay the ground for post-conflict accountability (Shattuck, 1999: 31). 
Importantly, however, war crimes were becoming bound to a human rights framework 
through the interpretive work of the ‘war crimes working group’. 
In fact the Tribunal also crucially laid the premise for the emergence of a new 
narrative of the conflict within the State Department, and gradually for a more explicit 
policy around war crimes as human rights atrocities. As the cumulative stream of 
evidence of atrocities and ethnic cleansing filtered its way through the State Department 
and intelligence agencies, the idea emerged that war crimes evidence and support for the 
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Tribunal could be vehicles for gaining leverage over the war. This idea gained 
momentum in a particular social location: among a small ‘human rights coalition’, or ‘war 
crimes working group’ that informally coalesced among mid-level officials and lawyers in 
the State Department Legal Adviser’s office and its Human Rights Bureau, a number of 
whom were active in setting up and supporting the ICTY (Hagan, 2003: 47; Shattuck, 
2003: 125, 130, 154).  
Arguments were made that human rights could be used as a pillar of geopolitical 
diplomacy (Albright, 2003: Ch. 12, 13), that peace and justice were not mutually exclusive 
(Holbrooke, 1998; Shattuck, 2003) and, as O’Brien would maintain, that they effectively 
needed a Realist school of human rights.6 The prosecution of war crimes and hard 
human rights abuses would not simply be moral idealism but part of a realpolitik strategy 
to push obstructionists and perpetrators to the side in order to end the war. UN 
Ambassador Madeleine Albright was a strong supporter of the idea, Secretary of State 
Warren Christopher broadly backed it, and soon Deputy Secretary of State Strobe 
Talbott and Anthony Lake at the National Security Council also approved its thrust 
(Holbrooke, 1998: 189). It created tensions around tactics, just as it raised ethical, legal 
and political ambiguities about whether to link war crimes to sanctions relief or to the 
substance of the peace negotiations (Albright, 2003: Ch.12; Shattuck, 2003: 130-1, 141). 
But as John Shattuck (2003: 201), Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human 
Rights, and Labor, later wrote, ‘human rights were by definition at the center of every 
issue that the [Dayton] peace conference would face’, so US policy was to give hard 
human rights atrocities a role in the political strategy to end the conflict.  
This framing derived in part from the composition of the policymakers 
themselves. A number of officials responsible for Bosnia policy had personal family 
backgrounds in East Central Europe or the Balkans. Albright’s aggressive activism, for 
instance, was intimately bound to her own personal experiences as an émigré from East 
Central Europe’s ethnic violence, and from close family connections to Yugoslavia;7 
Holbrooke was of mixed Central European Jewish background; and Paul Szasz, who had 
served the UN as an expert on international law and became a legal adviser to the lawyers 
crafting Dayton,8 was a Hungarian refugee from 1939. But more generally, many were 
young lawyers with backgrounds in human rights law or activism, international law and 
diplomacy, or constitutional law and civil rights.9 In fact, of the forty people working in 
the Tribunal’s Office of the Prosecutor, twenty-two were lawyers and investigators sent 
by the US; they had deep experience in human and civil rights activism, in and out of 
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government, and they contributed a key leadership cohort to the ICTY’s ‘distinctive 
Anglo-American atmosphere’ (Hagan, 2003: 64-8).  
The lawyers and low-level officials that loosely comprised this war crimes 
working group produced a state-centred narrative of ethnic cleansing and hard human 
rights atrocities focused on the perpetrators. This was informed by three factors. First, 
Moravscik (2005: 154-66) is right that American exceptionalism with respect to human 
rights is contingently dependent on specific domestic political cleavages, and especially 
on the presence or absence of a domestic liberal constituency around human rights. Such 
a constituency emerged in the early 1990s within the lower levels of the State 
Department bureaucracy. Second, these officials’ experiences reflected a normative 
commitment to the rule of law within a liberal legalist interpretive framework, as 
epitomized by their strong and unqualified support for the Tribunal (Shklar, 1986; Bass, 
2002: esp. Ch. 1; Hagan, 2003). And third, their understanding of the violence in Bosnia-
Herzegovina was explicitly political, not merely legalist: they interpreted evidence of war 
crimes as a series of politically orchestrated ethnic policies, not just as legal human rights 
violations; they viewed ethnicity as the content, not the driver, of political atrocities.10 
They built a conceptual framework around the perpetrator, the dynamics of the 
atrocities, and the politically-constituted violent and dynamic space between perpetrator 
and victim—highlighting the importance of understanding the social locatedness of the 
construction of human rights. 
 
The application of ‘putting cruelty first’ 
Our research suggests that US war crimes policy involved three related elements: the use 
of war crimes as evidence of political culpability to exclude indictees from negotiations 
and as post-conflict lustration; the collection of refugee/IDP interviews to support the 
ICTY; and the construction of a political framework around ethnic cleansing.  
 
A narrative of the perpetrators 
If pleas to make human rights central to US policy had been dismissed as idealistic by 
some administration officials, with the collapse of five different peace plans the use of 
war crimes indictments to remove radical or obstructionist leaders likely to derail future 
negotiations began to look quite realist. This amounted to what Shattuck now refers to as 
‘war-criminalectomy’.11 As a matter of formal policy the US leveraged the ICTY’s July 
1995 indictments of Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić to exclude them from the 
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Dayton process (Chollet, 2005: 87-8). Indeed the Tribunal worked on the same principle: 
politically isolate indicted war criminals from positions of power, even if they were not in 
custody (Matheson, 2006: 201).  
But this was not pursued consistently or unambiguously—highlighting some of 
the problems inherent in a ‘putting cruelty first’ framework. Holbrooke had been trying 
to isolate the Bosnian Serb leadership from the final Dayton negotiations since early 
1995, both for their extremism and for tactical reasons—to reduce the number of parties 
at the table, given that this was one of the reasons for the failure of previous Contact 
Group efforts.12 So a war-criminalectomy was one way to do it. And yet US negotiators 
had met with Mladić and Karadžić several times before Dayton, and the fact that they 
were negotiating with Slobodan Milošević was itself seen as both subverting the work of 
the Tribunal and legitimizing his complicity, if not culpability, in the mass atrocities. 
Moreover, excluding Mladić and Karadžić from negotiations might also have been illegal 
under international law because they had only been indicted, not convicted.13 To all of 
this the response was pragmatically realist: no amnesties were offered as a condition of 
negotiations and, as Holbrooke argued, ‘only the parties to the terrible conflict could end 
it…you can’t make peace without Milošević’ (quoted in Anonymous, 1996: 253). War 
criminalectomy defined political—not just legal—culpability. 
 This also had secondary lustration effects, although here, too, the impact was 
mixed. The civilian implementation Annex of the Dayton Agreement gave the newly 
established Office of the High Representative (OHR) the authority to prevent indicted 
war criminals from holding political office, and it had a certain utility. Together with the 
work of the Tribunal, lustration constituted a wider attempt at transitional and restorative 
justice, and it helped introduce new rules into post-conflict political culture. It was 
thought that by removing the former communists-turned-nationalists from political life, 
the indictments could create space for more moderate forces to emerge (Koh, 2003: 
1505).  
But NATO did not want responsibility for arresting war criminals, so in the first 
several years very few were indicted, much less arrested and tried. After Dayton, 
suspected war criminals remained at the heart of a network of criminal activity that made 
postwar reconciliation exceedingly difficult. Dayton did not provide enforcement 
authority. The 1997 Bonn Powers allowed OHR to continue ‘war criminalectomies’ by 
dismissing public officials for treaty non-compliance (‘anti-Dayton activities’) or for war 
crimes indictments.14 But the Bonn powers did not have a legal basis in Dayton, and in 
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fact elements of this lustration policy have been successfully challenged in Bosnian 
courts on human rights grounds.15  
The failure to arrest more war criminals had enormous implications for the 
return or resettlement of hundreds of thousands of forcibly displaced persons. Dayton’s 
Annex Seven had outlined extensive protections for refugees and IDPs, including the 
rights of return and, for the first time in international law, property restitution (Leckie, 
2007: 31-4). Support for the view that significant returns were possible was available in 
numerous State Department reports indicating that even the most traumatized refugees 
wanted to return to their homes, as long as it was safe and war criminals were 
prosecuted; indeed most blamed political elites for the brutalities, not their neighbours.16 
So there was a brief post-war ‘psychological window’ of time in which substantial return 
might have taken place.17 But involuntary return was also protected, i.e. the right not to 
return to the same conditions that had caused one to flee. So safe return was deeply 
affected by whether or not suspected war criminals were removed from a particular area 
(International Crisis Group, 1998).18 But because the Tribunal was too slow to indict, and 
because the first indictment, Duško Tadić, was a largely symbolic low-level perpetrator, 
the failure to indict quickly and arrest more—and more high profile—war criminals 
meant that substantial refugee return never materialized. 
 In summary, then, the exclusion and lustration of indicted war criminals was 
considered politically necessary and State Department press guidance reports emphasized 
that ‘prosecuting war crimes [was] in the long term interest of peace in the region’.19 
Despite its potential policy usefulness in the prevention of atrocities, as implemented it 
was insufficiently mindful of the underlying power structures of Bosnian politics and 
society and of the politics of displacement and return. War criminalectomies (and 
Dayton’s General Framework Agreement) were not targeted enough to subvert or 
dismantle the centres of power and patronage apparatuses in Bosnia-Herzegovina that 
had been the institutional support for the war. This would become something of a 
lesson-learned.20 Although they had not crafted a specifically tailored Balkan instrument, 
the effect of the war crimes working group’s attempts to put cruelty first had shifted the 
policy centre of gravity from the humanitarian universalism of human rights to a 
politically inflected universalism focused on state-led atrocities. War criminalectomy 
policies were framed around perpetrators’ political culpability as much as their legal 
violations of human rights. 
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A narrative of the victims 
In 1992 the UN Security Council established a Commission of Experts and a Special 
Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights. Both were charged with collecting 
and investigating evidence of war crimes. So a second US policy component was to 
enhance these evidence-gathering bodies by directly commissioning US embassy officials 
and investigators to conduct interviews in refugee camps in, for instance, Ankara, 
Vienna, Zagreb, Bonn, and Belgrade. The State Department’s Human Rights Bureau 
deployed officers to collect evidence and interview refugees, and in one year alone it 
produced five human rights reports based on embassy field reports, interviews with 
refugees, and the findings of human rights organizations (Shattuck, 2003: 131). By mid-
1995 the US embassy in The Hague had become a transfer point for information to be 
passed to the Tribunal, just as US intelligence agencies forwarded information to the 
legal advisor’s and lead prosecutor’s offices at the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) (on 
the latter, Hagan, 2003: 138). 
 One of the most important sources for State Department interviews was the 
Kirkareli refugee camp in Turkish Thrace. ‘Emboffs’ (Embassy officials) were able to 
enter where the ICRC was not, and their interviews with Bosnian Muslim refugees 
carefully documented the most horrifying ‘specific and gross human rights abuses’: 
people burned out of their homes, concentration camps for the systematic rape and 
impregnation of girls and women, beatings, mutilations and de-capitations, all manner of 
humiliating torture, summary executions of civilians, and other hard human rights 
atrocities. Importantly, credible witnesses were able to name specific perpetrators as 
people that they knew—just as many owed their survival to the assistance of ‘lone 
Serbs’—and they provided crucial information on chains of command in the detention 
and rape camps.21 Reports from Belgrade, Zagreb and Vienna Emboffs similarly 
documented details of brutalities, including fatal beatings, male rape and sodomization, 
corpses and mutilated bodies loaded into trucks, descriptions of grave site locations, and 
in one interview the fatal beating of a six year old child.22 
Admitting the difficulties of keeping up with the ‘enormous magnitude of human 
rights violations’,23 US officials forwarded these details and the names of credible 
witnesses to the Commission of Experts and to the OTP, with the explicit purpose of 
preparing for the war crimes trials.24 Because the prosecution of war criminals was ‘an 
important US policy objective’,25 corollary practices involved (i) tracking the movements 
of refugees/witnesses willing to testify, (ii) safely airlifting the most vulnerable to the 
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Tribunal, and (iii) commissioning a US Department of Defense (DoD) airlift of the 
Bosniak delegation to discuss war crimes investigations.26 For instance, in March 1994 
O’Brien drafted a memo to request that a US interagency team (a DoD prosecutor, an 
FBI forensic artist, and State Department representatives) be sent to interview refugees 
from Brčko, which had been ethnically cleansed in April-July 1992. The proximate aim 
was to work under the auspices of the UN War Crimes Commission and to assist the 
work of the Tribunal’s Chief Prosecutor, but the wider hope was that ‘our trip to 
interview witnesses [in Germany and Denmark] will prompt host countries to work 
actively in preparing information for the prosecutor’.27 
The effect of these policies was two-fold. Most immediately, the experiences of 
war crimes victims were inserted into the conflict, into the work of the Tribunal, and into 
the broader US diplomatic strategy toward Bosnia-Herzegovina. US officials’ 
interpretation of victims’ narratives offered them a degree of political agency in a 
moment in which it was existentially threatened. And secondly, a particular narrative 
among State Department officials was consolidated: it held that these war refugees were 
not merely abstract victims of human rights abuses, but more substantively, they were 
viewed as victims of nationalist policies. This strengthened the narrative of the war as 
politically manufactured and driven by the perpetrator’s (state’s) capacity for cruelty. 
  
War crimes as politically inflected human rights 
As the survivors’ accounts came in, and as more reports from human rights 
organizations and the ICRC were made available, desks within the State Department, 
including its intelligence bureau, or the Bureau of Intelligence Research (INR), added this 
evidence to their own internal field reports. The documentary evidence suggests that they 
continually reassessed the fundamental political and policy dynamics of ethnic cleansing, 
including with the use of ethnographic mapping and satellite imagery analysis. These 
assessments were folded into eight comprehensive war crimes reports.28 The result was a 
set of discrete assessments that were fundamentally political in their human rights 
implications. The narrative was politically universalist: war crimes, as human rights 
violations, were political atrocities that illegitimately victimized citizens. 
 The assessments concluded that the policies of ethnic cleansing involved ‘victims 
of nationalist policies’,29 ‘efforts to destroy social structures’,30 the ‘rape and abuse of 
women as an instrument of war’,31 a coordination, scale, intensity and orchestration of 
violence that was not reversible,32 brutalities that ‘did not arise spontaneously or by 
 13 
happenstance’,33 ‘evidence of high level complicity’ in the cruelties,34 ‘acts of genocide’,35 
and the use of various forms of ethnic cleansing as ‘deliberate levers of policy’36. In other 
words, this was a war and it was fought with ethnic strategies. For ICTY purposes, US 
reports of refugee interviews generally organized the substantive violations under legal 
human rights categories and sub-categories (e.g. political and extrajudicial killing, 
disappearance, arbitrary arrest and detention, right of association). But the organizing 
analysis was political, not legalistic. So, for instance, a November 1994 draft report noted 
that ‘ethnic cleansing…bears attributes of all categories of human rights abuses’, but 
concluded that this was fundamentally driven by ‘Serb [military and paramilitary] 
atrocities and acts of violence [that] were a matter of low-level loss of control or high-
level policy’.37 
The diffuseness of this kind of political analysis was most evident in three key 
substantive areas. First, State Department analysts concluded that the vast majority of the 
hard rights abuses were attributable to Bosnian Serbs with complicity from Belgrade—
countering both the European view of the conflict as a civil war, and the human rights 
NGO’s tendency for apolitical balance. Based on a number of field reports, State 
Department analyses highlighted Bosnian Serb-Belgrade command structures, 
systematically executed policies, methodical planning, and patterns in the violence—all of 
which helped to establish not only criminal liability for the Tribunal, but also political 
responsibility.38 Jon Western, an INR analyst, revealed American thinking: ‘Milošević was 
never going to call up his henchmen and say, ‘Go commit genocide.’ We had to develop 
the case by showing the systematic nature of the campaign. Only by working backwards 
could we show [genocidal] intent’ (quoted in Gratz, 2011: 411). Second was the 
conclusion that ethnic cleansing involved a ‘routinized campaign to destroy the Bosnian 
Muslim community’;39 that community leaders were systematically targeted based on 
municipal lists, both to send a message and to ‘figuratively decapitate Muslim society’; 
and that patterns of ‘clearance’, displacement and resettlement reflected orchestrated 
policies.40 And third, they repeatedly characterized the multiple rape and abuse of girls 
and women in at least sixteen ‘rape camps’ primarily as an instrument of war, not simply 
as a human rights violation. This prompted USAID to mobilize very specific 
interventions—learned, in part, from the treatment of trauma following the Vietnam 
War—to support the immediate and long-term needs of victims through, inter alia, 
support for local private voluntary organizations, hospital partnership programmes, and 
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programmes to train and upgrade the treatment of trauma and by making available child 
psychiatrists.41  
 In short, the State Department’s internal analyses were conceptually anchored 
politically, not in the legal language of human rights. The analyses focused on the 
dynamics of that violent space between perpetrator and victim. It was an interpretive 
formulation of hard human rights not based on universalist, constitutive properties of 
the victim, but one that re-balanced the conceptual focus to a perpetrator-centred 
political universalism because of a recognition of the state’s ability to inflict mass atrocity. 
 
Conclusion 
Our evidence suggests that key lower level US State Department officials of the informal 
‘war crimes working group’ constructed a narrative of (i) hard human rights violations in 
statist terms, of (ii) Bosnia’s victims as citizens requiring political agency in the face of 
atrocities, and of (iii) their human rights claims for protection as politically constituted—
all anchored around a ‘putting cruelty first’ policy focused on the state’s singular capacity 
for organized brutality, and on an interpretation of ‘war crimes’ qua ‘human rights 
abuses’. ‘War criminalectomies’ were used to remove indicted war criminals; ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ was interpreted substantively as an organized state-led effort to ‘destroy the 
social structure’ of nationality groups, rather than as a series of human rights abuses;42 
and the political agency of Bosnia’s refugees and displaced was under illegitimate political 
threat and in need of urgent articulation and protection.  
 In short, these ‘putting cruelty first’ interpretations had the effect of building a 
narrative of hard human rights atrocities around the perpetrator’s political culpability, not 
simply around the human dignity of victims of rights atrocities. They empirically 
acknowledged Shklar’s admonition that the power to coerce, to inflict fear, violence, and 
cruelty rested disproportionately with the state and its agents and institutions. In short, 
their ‘putting cruelty first’ policy was as concerned with defining state cruelty as it was 
with articulating victims’ vulnerability or dignity. It had important limitations, of course: 
as a way of actualizing hard human rights claims, it was prescriptively sobering because it 
involved ethical contradictions, political compromises, and the practical tradeoffs of 
imperfect policy choices.43 And while a perpetrator focus did accord political voice to 
rights claims in moments of mass atrocity—precisely when those voices were the most 
existentially threatened—it nevertheless moved away from the moral universalism that 
usually anchors human rights discourse. 
 15 
Yet more importantly, this particular vernacularization of human rights—by this 
particular group of social actors—also demonstrates the value of better understanding 
the role of agency in a broader sociology of human rights: the determinative social 
agency of the ‘war crimes working group’ exemplified the social situatedness or 
locatedness of human rights in that moment, particularly as they constructed hard human 
rights as a set of normative political values, and with a greater sensitivity to the 
perpetrators of atrocities. Put differently, a richer and deeper sociology of human rights 
requires a more rounded appreciation of human rights as socially situated, and reflective 
of the subjective experiences, interpretations, and, indeed, agency of key social actors in 
those social locations in which rights are actualized and socially embedded. 
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